It might, like Bohmian mechanics, tell us that whatsoever.
And the upshot is that we are not left with much to work with in devising a supervenience relation that provides a compelling account of our ordinary experience of classical-seeming objects.
More specifically, the essays concern the role of metaphysical commitments in providing a satisfactory account of experience in the context of the currently most promising formulations of quantum mechanics, formulations that seek to address the quantum measurement problem.
In order to get an idea of what is involved here, one might think of a resolution of the quantum measurement problem as involving two steps.
This requires that, regardless of what they may seem to be about, all formulations of quantum mechanics -- indeed all fundamental physical theories whatsoever -- are in fact about a primitive ontology consisting of entities with ordinary histories in ordinary 3-dimensional space.
We may ultimately want to account for the experiential intuitions of the primitive ontologist by showing how our best physical theories might, at some level of description, allow us to talk of ordinary objects with ordinary spatial relations.
Consequently, without a canonical approach to resolving the measurement problem, there can be no canonical sense of proper metaphysical commitment.
Even after choosing a preferred formulation of quantum mechanics, however, there is a significant degree of interpretational freedom that we might take to be in service of the type of explanation we want.
Second, and closely related, there is a sense in which quantum mechanics describes the state of the physical world not in terms of objects and events in the 3-dimensional space of ordinary experience, but in terms of objects and events in a high-dimensional configuration space.
As an example, a Bohmian might, as the physicist John Bell once suggested, think of Bohmian mechanics as describing a wave function that lives in 3 the particles.